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ABSTRACT 
This study examined the level of transparency among unit trust funds in Malaysia. Unit trust funds were 
the focus of this study due to its nature: unique, heavily regulated and rapidly growing. The study 
investigated the extent of disclosure in relation to the various mandato y and volunta y requirements and 
the roles of the specific characteristics of trustfunds in explaining their level of disclosure in the annual 
reports. Thefindings showed that the level of disclosure increased rapidly within the period of study 
suggesting that trust funds were becoming more transparent. With regard to the funds’ specific 
characteristics, the study showed that the influence was not consistent. The model best explained the 
disclosure level during thepre-mandato y period, i.e. 1996. During this year, the variables ’sponsor of the 
fund’ and ‘auditors’ significantly influenced the disclosure level in the predicted direction. In the other 
years (1997 and 1998), the explanato y power of the model was very low as suggested by the significant 
reduction in the adjusted R2. One argument was that during this period, the revised Guidelines had been 
issued and thus the model could not explain much the variation in the disclosure level as a large amount 
of the items in the study were already mandated. 
ABSTJXAK 
\ 
Kajian ini melihat tahap ketelusan di kalangan unit-unit d a m  amanah d i  Malaysia. Unit-unit dana 
amanah menjadi fokus kajian ini kerana sifatnya yang unik, industri ini dikawal ketat dan berkembang 
dengan pesat. Kajian ini rnelihat tahap pendedahan dengan mengkaji kesan-kesan keperluan sukarela dan 
kzperluan mndatori serta peranan beberapa ciri-ciri spesifik dana amanah dalam memberi penjelasan 
terhudap tahap pendedahan di dalam laporan tahunan. Dapatan kajian menunjukkan tahap pendedahan 
di dalam tempoh kajian meningkat ketara dan secara umumnya memperlihatkan tahap ketelusan yang 
semakin tinggi sepanjang tempoh kajian. Namun, dapatan kajian peranan ciri-ciri spesifik menunjukkan 
kesan ke atas tahap pendedahan adalah tidak konsisten di antara kajian. Model regresi yang terbaik 
diperoleh bagi tempoh pra-mndatori, iaitu 1996. Bagi tempoh ini, dua angkubah memberi kesan yang 
signifikan ke atas tahap pendedahan, iaitu penaja unit dana amanah dan juruaudit dan arah kesan seperti 
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yang dijangkakan. Bagi t m p o h  ketika dan pasca-mandatori, iaitu tahun 1997dan 1998, keupayaan model 
dalam menjelaskan tahap pendedahan amat rendah seperti yang ditunjukkun oleh R2 terlaras yang rendah. 
Ini berlaku kerana &lam tmpoh ini,garis panduan yang telah d ismkakan diterbitkandan dikuatkuasakan 
oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti Malaysia. 
’ 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue of corporate transparency has 
recently been a topic of interest particularly 
with the Asian financial crisis in 1997. 
Corporate transparency is about an entity 
disclosing all relevant and material information 
not already known to the public. In accounting, 
the major issue involving transparency is the 
level of disclosure in annual reports 
particularly relating to items that are not 
required to be disclosed either by regulatory 
bodies or by law. The amount of disclosure 
and the degree of compliance with the 
approved accounting standards serves as an 
indicator of high quality financial reporting. 
Malaysia’s seriousness in increasing the level 
of transparency is evident in the number of 
disclosure regulations and accounting 
standards that have been introduced by the 
relevant bodies in recent years. As suggested 
by Watts and Zimmerman (1986), these 
governmentally enforced regulations will 
improve the capital market’s ability to allocate 
capital more appropriately. 
Extant studies investigating transparency 
mainly focused on public companies. This 
study, on the other hand, attempts to examine 
the level of transparency among unit trust 
funds in Malaysia. Unit trust funds are the 
focus of this study due to its unique nature; a 
unit trust fund is neither a company which 
utilizes its assets to produce services or product, 
, 
nor a finance institution which accepts money 
from depositors which in turn lent to borrowers 
for profits. A unit trust fund accepts money 
from investors and issues units to the investors 
in return for the money. Unlike a finance 
institution, a trust fund does not lend money 
for profits but rather it uses the money to 
invest in various securities. Thus, being 
investment driven, the level of disclosure of a 
unit trust fund is expected to be high as all of 
its unit holders are investors. Furthermore, as 
a unit trust fund is an investor in nature, it 
would expect the entities in which it holds 
securities to be transparent. Therefore, a unit 
trust fund is also predicted to be transparent to 
promote high transparency level among 
companies. Thus, it is the purpose of this 
paper to investigate the level of transparency 
among unit trust funds in Malaysia. 
Additionally, unit trust funds have become a 
very popular type of investment among 
Malaysians, particularly in the 1980’s and 
1990’s. The government strongly encourages 
the public to invest in unit trusts because these 
funds are managed by professionals. This is 
evidenced by the large number of unit trust 
funds that are sponsored by either the Federal 
government or the State governments. The 
level of transparency among unit trust funds 
is expected to improve as a result of the various 
changes since the early 1990’s involving 
disclosure requirements to ensure that the 
interests of unit holders are protected. 
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This study focused on the financial 
disclosure provided by unit trust funds in 
their annual reports. Although various 
defimtions were given to the word ‘disclosure’ 
(see Azhar, 1998), we, nonetheless, restrict our 
definition of disclosure to all information 
disclosed by unit trust funds in their annual 
reports as per required by the Securities 
Commission (SC) as contained in the 
Guidelines and the proposed accounting 
standard issued by the Malaysian Accounting 
Standard Board (MASB). 
BACKGROUND 
As at December 1998, there were a total of 
ninety-two approved funds or schemes 
managed by thirty-two management 
companies (http: / /www.sc.com.my). The 
1990’s alone saw a very rapid growth in the 
unit trust industry in Malaysia where sixty- 
three funds were set up during the period 1990 
to 1998. The growth pattern continued in the 
year 2000 where another seventeen new trust 
funds were launched (The New Straits Times, 
14 February 2001). 
Prior to the establishment of the SC in 
1993, the unit trust fund industry was under 
the purview of the Guidelines on Unit Trust 
Funds, which was issued in 1991 by the Capital 
Issue Committee (CIC). Compliance to the 
Guidelines was not compulsory. In 1994, 
following its establishment, the SC adopted 
the Guidelines, known as Guidelines on Unit 
Trust Funds 2994 (hereafter referred to as the 
Guidelines). Compliance to these Guidelines 
was mandatory. Following a revision, the 
revised Guidelines were issued by the SC in 
1997 known as Guidelines on Unit Trust Funds 
(here after referred to as the revised 
Guidelines). These revised Guidelines were 
mandatory and superseded the earlier 
Guidelines. The revised Guidelines imposed 
various additional disclosures which were 
considered as important in evaluating the 
performance of a trust fund. Contents of the 
annual report of the trust funds were outlined 
in Schedule VI of the Revised Guidelines. 
Variations in the items disclosed in annual 
reports of unit trusts still prevail despite the 
reporting requirements imposed by the SC 
(MASB, 1998). The issuance of the Draft 
Statement of Principles 2 (DSOP 2), Financial 
Reporting by Unit Trusts, in 1998 by MASB was 
an attempt to address this issue of variation in 
reporting. DSOP 2 specifies items to be 
disclosed in the financial statements and the 
methods of measuring certain items for 
disclosure, which were not previously covered 
in the revised Guidelines. Thus, DSOP 2 
addresses the issue of disclosure and 
measurement not dealt with by the revised 
Guidelines. However, unlike the revised 
Guidelines, DSOP 2 is not mandatory. 
The scope of this study was limited to the 
disclosure practice due to data unavailability 
at the time of the study. This study did not deal 
with the measurement and recognition aspects 
of financial reporting. The reason was that 
these issues of recognition and measurement 
were only addressed in 1998, following the 
issuance of DSOP 2. 
No research evidence on disclosure 
practices by unit trust funds in Malaysia is 
currently available. Nevertheless, several 
studies on disclosure practices by companies 
in other industries are available. For example, 
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Ku Nor Izah and Shamsul Nahar (1998) 
conducted a study on mandatory disclosure 
practice among general insurers and Hashanah 
(1999) examined disclosure practices of banks 
in Malaysia. On more general industries, 
Hossain, Lin and Adams (1994), Normah and 
Abu Bakar (1995) and Azhar (1998) studied 
the disclosure practices by companies listed 
on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE). 
Thus, the present study will add further to our 
knowledge about disclosure practices in 
Malaysia by focusing on the unit trust industry. 
Given the foregoing background, this 
study attempts to investigate the reporting 
trend among Malaysian unit trust funds, 
starting from the period before the issuance 
of the revised Guidelines (i.e. 1996) until 
shortly after the DSOP was released for 
comment in 1998. The objectives of the study 
are as follows: 
1. To investigate the extent of disclosure in 
the annual reports of unit trust funds 
following the issuance of Guidelines in 
1994, after the issuance of the revised 
Guidelines in 1997, and after the issuance 
of the DSOP 2 in 1998, and 
2. To exam&e the extent to which disclosure 
is influenced by size of a fund, auditor and 
sponsor of the fund. 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Despite the growing criticism that annual re- 
ports provide outdated information and are 
thus not considered useful in helping make 
decisions, at least in Malaysia, evidence shows 
that annual reports are among the most impor- 
tant sources of information 
analysts (Ku Nor Izah and 
used by financial 
Zuaini, 1995; and 
Azhar, 1998). This evidence was further sup- 
ported by a comment from a financial analyst 
whoindicatedthattheannualreportwasamong 
the major formal sources of information that 
analysts usually relied upon (Razani, 2000). 
Research on the extent of disclosure has 
been conducted extensively throughout the 
world, particularly in the US (e.g. Cerf, 1961; 
Firer and Meth, 1986; Chow and Wong-Boren, 
1987; and Chew and Lee, 1990). However, 
none of extant studies on disclosures focussed 
on unit trust fund industry, whether in Malay- 
sia or in other parts of the world. 
A low level of disclosure was observed 
worldwide in the 1970’s (Buzby, 1974; Barrett, 
1976; Firth, 1979; and Azhar, 1998). In his 
comparative study, Barrett (1976) found that 
there were differences in the level of disclo- 
sure among companies in the US and those of 
other countries. Companies in the US were 
found to have a higher disclosure level than 
those in the UK, Japan, France, Germany, 
Sweden and the Netherlands. In his study on 
the UK companies, Firth (1979) found that the 
disclosure levels were very low. He argued 
that one possible reason for the lack of disclo- 
sure was that the finance director, and to some 
extent their auditors, might not have been be 
aware of the importance of some of the items 
to the users of the financial reports. 
Studies conducted during the 1980’s 
showed that the disclosure level remained 
unsatisfactory. For instance, the studies on 
voluntary disclosures in South Africa (Firer 
and Meth, 1986) and Singapore (Chew and 
Lee, 1990) showed that the level of disclosures 
was not up to the level financial analysts were 
Malaysian Management Journal 5 (1&2), 65 - 87 (2001) 
69 
expecting. Wallace (1988), in a study on the 
mandatory disclosure among Nigerian com- 
panies, concluded that there was a poor com- 
pliance with the disclosure requirements. 
In Malaysia, a series of research studies 
had been carried out in the 1990’s to examine 
the disclosure practices by Malaysian compa- 
nies. For instance, studies by Hossain et al. 
(1994), and Normah and Abu Bakar (1995) on 
voluntary disclosure by the Kuala Lumpur 
Stock Exchange (KLSE) listed companies sug- 
gested that the disclosure levels were unsatis- 
factory. Recent evidence employing the longi- 
tudinal approach offered by Hashanah (1999) 
and Azhar (1998) revealed that disclosure lev- 
els did improve over time. They attributed 
that the improvement was due to the increased 
mandatory disclosure requirements being im- 
posed upon companies throughout the period 
of their study as evidenced by the sudden 
increase in the level of disclosures on manda- 
tory items. In another related work, Shaari 
(1997) found that the Asian region countries 
were rapidly progressing towards developing 
a useful and comprehensive disclosure pack- 
age. This development should thus, be reflec- 
tive of the growing importance of capital mar- 
kets in‘this region as a source of financing of a 
Various firm-specific characteristics had 
been examined as an attempt to explain a 
firm’s disclosure level (see, for example, 
Singhvi (1968), Buzby (1974), Stanga (1976)’ 
Firth (1979), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), 
Cooke (1989 and 1991)’ Ahmed and Nicholls 
(1994)’ Hossainet al. (1994), Wallace andNaser 
(1995), and Ku Nor Izah and Shamsul Nahar 
(1998)). Among the major characteristics stud- 
ied which have indicated some positive rela- 
firm. \ 
tionships were size of a reporting entity and 
auditor size. As this study attempts to extend 
previous studies into the unit trust industry, 
the previously-empirically-tested variables 
together with a new variable, that is the spon- 
sor of the fund, will be utilised in this study as 
they are expected to affect the level of disclo- 
sure of unit trust funds. The type of sponsor is 
expected to be important as it is very common 
in Malaysia and it provides a varying degree 
of security in the investment. Each of the vari- 
ables is explained in the following sections. 
Size of Fund 
Research evidence involving companies has 
consistently shown that size has a positive 
relationship with the disclosure level. Several 
arguments have been offered to support the 
positive relationship. First, collecting and dis- 
seminating information is a costly exercise, 
and thus, it is always the larger firms that can 
afford such expenses (Atiase, Babber and Free- 
man, 1988). Additional costs that will be in- 
curred by large firms are considered insignifi- 
cant since the information systems are de- 
signed to fulfil the various reporting require- 
ments. Therefore, with the information that is 
readily available, it is just a matter of deter- 
mining what is to be disclosed. For a small 
firm, most of the information is collected on 
the specific need basis and a comprehensive 
information system rarely exists. Another rea- 
son that has been put forward is that fuller 
disclosure by small firms will put them in a 
competitively disadvantageous position in 
comparison with larger firms in the industry 
(Hossainand Adarns, 1995). Hence, small firms 
are likely to disclose less information than big 
firms. Large companies are always regarded 
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as entities of economic significance so that 
there may be greater demands on them to 
provide information for their customers, sup- 
pliers, analysts, government as well as the 
public. Since unit trust funds are also eco- 
nomic entities, and are to some extent similar 
to companies, the foregoing arguments would 
also apply to the former. 
Size of an entity appeared to be a common 
characteristic selected as an independent vari- 
able in most studies. Except for studies under- 
taken by Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) in Bang- 
ladesh, and Ku Nor Izah and Shamsul Nahar 
(1998) in Malaysia, other studies e.g. Singhvi 
(1968), Firth (1979), Chow and Wong-Boren 
(1987), Cooke (1989 and 1991), Gibbins et al. 
(1990), Frost and Pawnall (1994), Hossain et 
al. (1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), and 
Marston and Robson (1997)) showed that the 
extent of disclosure increases with firm size. 
However, in a study conducted on Hong 
Kong firms, big and small companies were 
found to disclose more mandatory items than 
the medium-sized firms (Tai, Au-Yeung and 
Lau, 1990). 
Given the foregoing discussion, the fol- 
lowing hypothesis is proposed: 
, 
\ 
23, : The level of disclosure in the annual reports of 
unit trust funds is positively related to  the size 
of t h e f i n d .  
Previous studies involving public-listed 
companies employed various proxies to meas- 
ure variable size. The most commonly used 
measurements for size are total assets and 
market capitalization. Of these two, market 
capitalization reflects the market valuation of 
a firm’s total wealth. In the case of a unit trust 
fund in Malaysia, the market does not value its 
units in circulation; rather, the value of its unit 
in circulation is determined by the market 
value of its portfolio (i.e. investment in securi- 
ties). The market value of a unit trust fund is 
the net assets value (NAV). Thus, being influ- 
enced by the market, the use of a fund’s NAV 
as a measure of size was appropriate for this 
study. Furthermore, NAV is an important in- 
dicator for a unit trust fund performance as 
well as an important factor in determining the 
selling and buying price of the units. Thus, 
NAV is like market capitalization for a listed 
company which is reflective of the market 
valuation of the company. 
Auditor  
An Auditor is entrusted to give an opinion 
about the ”true and fair” view of the financial 
position of a firm. The type of opinion issued 
by an auditor about the financial position of a 
company is determined by audit quality. The 
issue of audit quality becomes important due 
the nature of an audit work, which is subjec- 
tive and inevitably varies between auditors. 
The extent of audit investigation determines 
the auditor’s independence (O’Sullivan, 2000) 
so as to enable the auditor to arrive at the right 
opinion. 
The opinion of “true and fair” depends 
largely upon the audit investigation, a firm’s 
compliance with the stipulated requirements, 
and the guidelines pertinent to the firm to 
reflect its underlying financial position. It has 
been argued and empirically shown that the 
quality of audit varies between auditors 
(Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramayam, 
1998). DeAngelo (1981) defined audit quality 
as the joint probability of detecting a breach in 
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the client’s accounting system and subsequent 
reporting of the breach. In addition, Collier 
and Gregory (1996) noted that an auditor’s 
ability to discover irregularities depends 
largely on the freedom to determine the suit- 
able audit procedures and the extent of their 
implementation. 
Hence, an auditor who is perceived to be 
more independent will carry out a detailed 
audit investigation to ensure that the informa- 
tion contained in the published annual reports 
is reflective of the firm’s economic underlying. 
In the literature, audit independence is meas- 
ured by its size. A large audit firm is argued to 
maintain its reputation as a provider of quality 
audit than its smaller counterparts (Hossain et 
al., 1995). Inability to discover errors and low 
disclosure level would have direct negative 
consequences on the reputation of a large au- 
dit firm, as perceived by the markets. The 
associated hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H,: The level of disclosure in the annual reports of 
unit trust f i n d s  is positively influenced by 
auditor independence. 
, Extant evidence on the influence of audi- 
tor size, a measure of auditor independence on 
the level of discloshre, is mixed. While Ahmed 
and Nicholls (1994), found that the extent of 
mandatory disclosure varies with auditor size 
in Bangladesh, Wallace and Naser (1995) docu- 
mented a reverse relationship among Hong 
Kong firms. However, in an earlier study con- 
ducted in Hong Kong, Tai et al. (1990) showed 
that there was no relationship between auditor 
size and firms’ level of disclosure, and this 
finding is consistent with those of Firth (1979), 
Hossain et al. (1994) and Ku Nor Izah and 
Shamsul Nahar (1998). The fact that those stud- 
ies were conducted in different countries with 
different degrees of market sophistication and 
extensiveness of regulations might explain the 
conflicts in the findings. 
A Fund’s Sponsor 
In Malaysia, unit trust funds can be divided 
into two: government funds (i.e. established 
by the Federal or State Governments) and 
private funds. A government fund is estab- 
lished with the objective of upgrading the 
status of the people and it usually allows a 
small investment (i.e. minimum of RM10). 
Moreover, in the case of Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad, managing the largest trust funds in 
Malaysia, unit holders ranging between R M l O  
and RM5,OOO of investment make up the larg- 
est portion of the investors in its unit trust 
funds (Utusan Malaysia, 27 April 2002). A 
total of 6.7 million investors fall within this 
range of investment. These investors are con- 
sidered unsophisticated and are expected to 
place less reliance on published information 
in making their investment decisions. Moreo- 
ver, a great majority of the unit holders in 
government-sponsored funds hold small 
amounts of investment. Thus, the reporting 
practices of a government fund are predicted 
to be different from those of a private fund. 
Thus, given the users’ low dependence on the 
annual reports, it is expected that the level of 
disclosure among unit trust funds sponsored 
by the government is low. 
A private fund is established with the 
primary objective of saving and securing sta- 
ble future dividend flows. It always works as 
an alternative to a fixed deposit as it generally 
offers attractive returns. The amount of in- 
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vestment by individual unit holders in private 
trust funds is generally large with a minimum 
investment of RM500. Thus, given the signifi- 
cant amount being invested in the fund, unit 
holders are predicted to be very concerned 
with their investments and their primary 
source of information is contained in the an- 
nual reports. Thus, it is expected that their 
dependence on published information is high. 
Unit holders of a private fund are also 
different compared with those of a state fund 
with respect to their ability to make a sound 
investment analysis. Given the fact that their 
investment is not backed by the government 
and would usually involve a big amount of 
money, unit holders of a private fund are pre- 
dicted to be more careful when making their 
investment-related decisions. Hence, their reli- 
ance on the accounting data is predicted to be 
high. Therefore, given this expectation, theman- 
agers of private funds are predicted to disclose 
more information and to comply with all the 
relevant standardsbetter thana state fund does. 
The foregoing discussion thus leads to the 
following hypothesis. 
H3: The t p e  of the sponsor of a f i n d  does not 
influenc'e the level of disclosure in the annual 
reports. 
METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection 
Data were collected from the annual reports of 
unit trust funds for a period covering 1996 to 
1998. The period from 1996 to 1998 was chosen 
because the revised Guidelines was made ef- 
fective in May 1997 and the DSOP was issued in 
July 1998; hence this would enable researchers 
to compare disclosure practices during the pre- 
mandatory period (i.e. 1996); after the revised 
Guidelines was made mandatory (i.e. 1997) 
and after the issuance of DSOP 2 (i.e. 1998). 
Only trust funds that issued complete 
annual reports during this period were in- 
cluded in the analysis of this study. Ninety- 
two funds were operating as of December 
1998. However, only sixty-four issued their 
annual reports between 1996-1998. Requests 
for annual reports were made to respective 
fund managers through the mail. Annual re- 
ports were also gathered from the library. 
From these two sources, the authors managed 
to gather complete annual reports from fifty- 
seven funds. This represented about sixty-two 
percent of the total population. Table 1 presents 
the distribution of the fifty-seven unit trust 
funds by sponsorship and auditor size. 
Data Collection 
The Data collection process involved prepar- 
ing a scoring sheet listing the sections and 
items that needed to be disclosed in the annual 
reports according to Schedule VI of the re- 
vised Guidelines as well as those of DSOP 2. 
Items that required disclosure as contained in 
the revised Guidelines were considered man- 
datory in both 1997 and 1998. Items that were 
found in the DSOP 2 were considered volun- 
tary throughout the period under study. The 
revised Guidelines specified eight sections to 
be reported in the annual reports, each with a 
different number of disclosure items totalling 
ninety-seven items, which were deemed rel- 
evant for constructing the disclosure index. 
Details on the items included in the index are 
listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of Funds by Type of Sponsor and Auditor 
I Types of Fund No. of Funds Percent I 
40.35 
59.65 
Government sponsored funds 
Private funds 
Total 100.00 
Auditor 
Big 6* 39 68.42 
Non-Big 6 18 3 1.58 
Total 57 100.00 
* The big-6 was later known as big-5 following the formation of Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (i.e. PWC) in 1998. 
Out of the eight sections covered by the 
revised Guidelines, four were already con- 
tained in the 1994 Guidelines. These sections 
were balance sheet, income statement, audit 
report and management review. The cash flow 
statement, a section found in DSOP 2, was also 
included in the index of disclosure resulting in 
a total of nine sections. Consequently, this 
study examined each of the funds' annual 
reports to determine the frequency of report- 
ing of each of the nine sections and the disclo- 
sure level involving the ninety-seven items. 
Table 2 reveals the sections and the distribu- 
tion of the relevant disclosure items. 
Table 2 
Distribution of the Items in the Disclosure Index 
Sections Number of Items Percent 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Management Review* 
Trustee Report 
Balance Sheet* 
Income Statement" 
Statement of Changes in Net Asset Value 
Cash Flow Statement** 
Notes to the Accounts 
Audit Report* 
Performance Data 
18 
1 
11 
16 
7 
2 
21 
1 
20 
18.56 
1.03 
11.34 
16.49 
7.22 
2.06 
21.65 
1.03 
20.62 
Total 97 100 
** Required merely under DSOP 2. 
* Sections to be disclosed since the 1994 Guidelines. 
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Disclosure Level 
To determine the level of disclosure by a fund 
for each year under study, two measures of 
disclosure level were adopted. The first meas- 
ure treats each of the nine sections in the 
annual reports as equally important without 
assigning weight. This means that a fund 
would be assigned 1 /9* of the total score for 
the disclosure of each section regardless of the 
comprehensiveness of the section. Thus the 
total score (labelled as E) would range be- 
tween ”0” (for nondisclosure) and “1” (for 
disclosing all the sections). 
The second method to measure the dis- 
closure level used in this study (i.e. total dis- 
closure, TD) was to treat each of the disclosure 
items deemed to be relevant to the fund as 
equally important. This is known as a dichoto- 
mous procedure. This method is found in 
most studies investigating disclosure in an- 
nual reports [see, for example, Buzby (1974), 
Firth (1979), Firer and Meth (1986), Wallace 
(1988), Cooke (1989), Chew and Lee (1990), 
Azhar (1998) and Ku Nor Izah and Shamsul 
Nahar (1998)l. This method assigns a value 
”1” if it is disclosed, and ”0” if it is not dis- 
closed to a partiplar item. The TD score for 
each fund was calculated as follows: 
m 
TD = Zdi 
i=l 
where d = 1 if the item diis disclosed, 
0 if the item di is not disclose, 
and 
m 5 n (see below) 
In cases involving funds which did not 
disclose irrelevant items, their non-disclosure 
of that item was not penalised. However, if the 
relevant item was not disclosed, a score “0” 
would be given. Decisions on whether an item 
was of relevance to the fund were arrived at 
upon a review of the annual report, as sug- 
gested by Cooke (1989). For instance, if it was 
mentioned in the annual reports that divi- 
dends were distributed by the fund, but the 
date of the distribution was not disclosed, 
then it was concluded that the item was rel- 
evant but not disclosed, and thus a score “0” 
would be given. Similar to the approach used 
by Cooke (1989), the additive model used was 
not weighted as each item of disclosure was 
treated as equally important. 
Once the score on disclosure (i.e. TD) was 
computed, an index was computed to meas- 
ure the relative level of disclosure by the fund. 
The index is the ratio of the total score of the 
fund to the score that the fund was expected to 
receive (if all relevant items were disclosed). 
The maximum score (M) a fund could receive 
varies depending upon the number of rel- 
evant items: 
n 
i= l  
M =  C.di 
where d = expected item of disclosure, and 
n = the number of relevant items 
The total disclosure index (TDI) for each 
fund for each year was computed by dividing 
TD (score) over M (score). The index ranged 
between ”0” and ”1”. A score of ”1” indicated 
that the fund disclosed all the relevant items as 
required by the Guidelines and DSOP 2; while 
a score of ”0” meant that the fund disclosed 
none of the relevant items. 
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Hypotheses Testing 
A multiple regression analysis was conducted 
for each period to test the hypotheses: 1996, 
1997and 1998. Each regression model included 
fund size, auditor, and a fund’s sponsor as the 
independent variables. The influence of a 
fund’s year end was included in the regression 
model as the effective date of revised Guide- 
lines had different impact on a fund’s disclo- 
sure depending on the fund’s balance sheet 
date. Total disclosure index (i.e. TDI) was used 
as the dependent variable rather than total 
score (i.e. E) due to the comprehensive nature 
of the former. The ordinary least square (OLS) 
technique therefore suggests the following 
model (for each year): 
TDI = a + b,LnNAV + b,Audit + b,Sponsor 
+ b, Yrend + e, 
where: TDI = 
LnNAV = 
Audit = 
Sponsor = 
Yrend = 
- &  
Total Disclosure Index; 
Natural log of net asset 
value; 
1 for ‘big 6’ audit firm or 
’0’ otherwise; 
1 for a government-spon 
sored fund or 0 other- 
wise; 
1996 and 1998 models: ”1” 
i f k e  balance sheet date 
falls after mid-year or ”0” 
otherwise; 
1997 model: ”1” if the bal 
ance sheet date falls in 
May and after, or ”0” 
otherwise; 
error term; and 
Size, being measured by NAV, was ex- 
pressed in logarithm form. The transforma- 
tion was necessary due to the non-normal 
distribution of the data. Transformation of 
such continuous variables was found in Cooke 
(1989), Ahrned and Nicholls (1994) and Ku 
Nor Izah and Shamsul Nahar (1998). Classifi- 
cation of the balance sheet date for the 1997 
model differs from those of 1996 and 1998. The 
difference in models was due to the fact that 
the revised Guidelines were made effective in 
May 1997. 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Extent of Disclosure 
Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of 
the reporting of sections in the annual reports 
for the period 1996 to 1998. Overall, there was 
a steady and significant increase in the report- 
ing of sections in the annual reports. The mean 
score for the overall sections reported in 1996 
was 0.55, compared to 0.77 and 0.89 in 1997 
and 1998 respectively. The increase was sig- 
nificant as shown by the paired t-tests of the 
years 1996-1997 and 1997-1998. The Findings 
also showed that both the management re- 
view and the income statement were disclosed 
by almost all funds. Audit reports were also 
disclosed by more than ninety-five percent of 
the funds, except for 1998. These findings were 
expected since these sections were already 
made mandatory before 1996. Nevertheless, 
the reporting of the balance sheet was rela- 
tively low in 1996 although it was also made 
mandatory in both the 1991 and 1994 Guide- 
lines. The reporting frequency of the balance 
sheet increased sigruficantly in 1997 and 1998. 
As shown in Table 3, the reporting of the 
cash flow statement and performance data 
Malaysian Management Journal 5 (1&2), 65 - 87 (2001) 
76 
were relatively low. This evidence could be 
attributed to the fact that the cash flow state- 
ment and the performance data have never 
been mandated by the revised Guidelines. 
However, the steady and sigruficant increase 
in the scores of all sections suggests that man- 
datory requirements were the reasons for the 
funds' high disclosure level. 
Table 3 
Results on the Reporting of Sections in the Annual Reports during 1996 to 1998 
Section in the Annual 
Report 
Overall Content (E) 
Management Review" 
Trustee Report 
Balance Sheet" 
Income Statement" 
Statement of Changes 
in Net Asset 
Cash Flow Statement 
Notes to the Accounts 
Audit Report" 
Performance Data 
Mean Score 
1996 
0.55 
1 .oo 
0.12 
0.67 
1.00 
0.47 
0.08 
0.74 
0.88 
0.00 
-
1997 
- 
0.77 
1 .oo 
0.63 
0.84 
0.98 
0.68 
0.49 
0.86 
0.96 
0.46 
- 
" Sigruficant at 5% level. 
** Sigruficant at 1% level. 
a Mandated since the 1994 Guidelines. 
Subsequently, results on the extent of 
disclosure using the TDI as the measure of 
disclosure level also showed that there was 
a significant increase in the disclosure lev- 
els during the three-year period. As de- 
picted in Table 4, the mean TDI scores in 
1996,1997 and 1998 were 0.4279,0.6429 and 
0.8252 respectively. Further analysis using 
t-tests revealed that theincrease between 
1996 to 1997, and 1997 to 1998 were signifi- 
cant at the one percent and five percent 
levels respectively. 
- 
1998 
0.89 
0.98 
0.84 
1.00 
1 .oo 
0.86 
0.70 
0.96 
0.95 
0.75 
Pairec 
1996 & 1997 
t 
-7.47 
-7.62 
-3.45 
1 .oo 
-2.84 
-5.42 
-2.43 
-2.32 
-6.85 
- 
Sig. 
0.000*" 
O.OOo"* 
0.001'* 
0.322 
0.006"" 
0.000"" 
0.018" 
0.024" 
0 . 0 ~ " "  
- 
Hest 
1997 & 1998 
t 
-4.66 
1 .oo 
-3.86 
-3.24 
-1.00 
-2.46 
-3.02 
-2.57 
0.44 
-4.88 
Sig. 
O.OOO"* 
0.322 
0.00"" 
0.002"" 
0.322 
0.017* 
0.004"" 
0.013" 
0.659 
0.000"" 
Impact of Fund's Characteristics on Disclosure h e 1  
Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for 
the dependent and explanatory variables used 
in the regression tests. 
The findings suggested that the amount of 
disclosure (i.e. mean of TDI) increased by almost 
double from 42.79 percent in 1996 to 82.52 per- 
cent in 1998. This evidence suggests the level of 
transparency improved over this period. The 
expandedrequirements contained in the revised 
Guidelines (1997) as well as the DSOP 2 (1998) 
contributed much to this increase. 
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Descriptive Statistics (n=57) 
Variables LnNAV 
LnNAV 1.000 
Sponsor 
Auditor 
TDI 
77 
Sponsor Auditor TDI 
-.105 (.443) .389* (.OOO) .204 (.132) 
1 .ooo .595* (.OOO) -.702* (.OOO) 
1 .ooo .642* (.OOO) 
1 .ooo 
TDI96 
LnNA96 
TDI97 
LnNA97 
TDI98 
LnNA98 
Mean 
0.4279 
3.9216 
0.6429 
3.8929 
0.8252 
3.4220 
Median 
0.4713 
4.5533 
0.6962 
4.4498 
0.8750 
3.8869 
SD 
0.1341 
2.0162 
0.2228 
1.8352 
0.1231 
1.9429 
Min. 
0.16 
-0.06 
0.20 
-0.02 
0.50 
-1.61 
Max. 
0.65 
7.61 
0.99 
6.68 
0.97 
7.32 
Skewness 
-0.356 
-0.432 
-0.412 
-0.614 
-1.049 
-0.660 
Kurtosis 
-1.173 
-1.086 
-0.846 
-0.885 
0.143 
-0.302 
Results of the correlation analysis of the 
variables are presented in Table 5. It shows that 
the size of a trust fund is positively associated 
with the size of the au&t firm. This is generally 
consistent with our expectation. However, one 
interesting finding is that the correlation be- 
tween the type of sponsor and the size of the 
audit firm is negative and sigruficant. This find- 
ing suggested that government (private) spon- 
sored funds are associated with (non) big-six 
audit firms. This implies that private funds rely 
big-six audit finns, which may be interpreted 
more on the services of as being consistent with 
thesignallingtheory. Thecorrelationbetween the 
type of a fund's sponsor and the TDI was consist- 
ently negative but it was only sigruficant in 1997. 
\ 
Thus, this negative correlation is consist- 
ent with our prediction. Finally, the direction of 
association between the auditors and the TDI 
was not consistent throughout the period of 
study. The association was positive and signifi- 
cant in 1997. The relation was positive in 1997 
but it was not significant. In 1998, the associa- 
tion became negative and significant. One ex- 
planation is that the role of the auditor might be 
important in the absence of regulations (i.e. 
1996). In the presence of regulations (i.e. 1998), 
big-six auditors' roles might have lagged be- 
hind that of the non big-six as all trust funds 
were subjected to the additional requirements 
which had complied with trust funds which 
employed big-six audit firms. 
Table 5 
Pearson-Product Moment Correlation Analysis 
Panel A : 1996 
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Variables 
LnNAV 
Sponsor 
Auditor 
TDI 
LnNAV Sponsor Auditor TDI 
1.000 -.208 (.121) .463* (.OOO) .001 (.995) 
1 .ooo .104 (.442) 
1 .ooo .595* (.OOO) -.142 (.294) 
1 .ooo 
Variables 
W A V  
Sponsor 
Auditor 
TDI 
* Significant at 5 percent level (p-value in parenthesis) 
LnNAV Sponsor Auditor T D I  
1.000 -.297* (.025) .489* (.OOO) .WO (.768) 
1 .ooo .595* (.OOO) 221 (.098) 
1 .ooo -.381* (.WO) 
1.000 
The results in Table 5 suggested that the 
problem of multicollinearity was not serious. 
However, each of the explanatory variables 
was alternately regressed on all the other 
explanatory variables to determine the sever- 
ity of the multicollinearity problem in the 
regression model used in testing the hypoth- 
esis. *According to Kleinbaum, Kupper and 
Muller (1988), a severe multicollinearity prob- 
lem exists when the resulting R2 from each 
regression is more than ninety percent or 
when R is greater than ninety-five percent. 
The results of this analysis showed that 
multicollinearity was not a problem in any of 
the regression analysis as the R2from each 
regression was far below the ninety percent 
level. 
\ 
Regress ion Res uI t s 
Results of the regression analysis are shown 
in Table 6. Overall, the model showed a de- 
creasing trend as depicted by the decreasing 
adjusted R2, from fifty-seven percent in 1996 
to justed R2, from fifty-seven percent in 1996 
to only fifteen percent in 1998. Throughout 
the period, the findings were mixed. For vari- 
able size, the influence was only significant in 
the year 1998 in the predicted direction. 
Inconsisteent findings were also observed 
with regard to the status of the sponsor, 
wereby the influence was only significant in 
the predicted direction in 1996. Significant 
influence of audit firms was found only for 
1996 and 1998, but the direction of the influ- 
ence was not consistent for these two years. It 
was in the hypothesised direction in 1996 and 
in the opposite direction in 1998. 
Based on the above findings, the extent 
of the influence of size of funds, auditors 
and status of the sponsor was mixed. How- 
ever, the mixed influence was expected as 
the year 1996 was considered a pre-manda- 
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tory period and year 1998 was considered a 
post-mandatory period. The year 1997, on the 
other hand, was considered a transitory period. 
Thus the crucial periods were 1996 and 1998. 
In panel A of Table 6, two variables, namely 
sponsors and auditors, mfluence the extent of 
disclosure by unit trust funds, in the hypoth- 
esised directions. The regression model was 
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statistically sigruficant with an adjusted R2 of 57 
percent. The year, i.e. 1996, was considered a 
voluntary period as the revised Guidelines was 
not yet issued. Thus, a great amount of informa- 
tion disclosed was entirely determined by the 
management. Moreover, the arguments put 
forward in developing the hypothesis might 
have been relevant in a voluntary setting. 
Table 6 
Results of Regression Tests 
Panel A : 1996 
Coefficient SD t-ratio p-value 
LnNAV96 
Sponsor 
Audit 
Yrend 
Constant 
0.0031 0.007 0.482 0.632 
-0.1530 0.031 -4.882 0.000 
0.0699 0.037 1.914 0.061 
0.0326 0.027 1.222 0.227 
0.4300 0.037 11.670 0.000 
R2 = 0.601 R2 (adj.) = 0.570 F-ratio = 19.231 p = 0.000 
Panel B : 1997 
Coefficient SD t-ratio p-value 
LnNAV97 
Sponsor 
Audit 
' Yrend 
Constant 
-0.0021 0.016 0.1272 0.899 
-0.051 9 0.066 -0.781 0.438 
-0.0038 0.078 -0.049 0.961 
0.2530 0.060 4.245 0.000 
0.4880 0.092 5.309 0.000 
R2 = 0.275 R2 (adj.) = 0.219 F-ratio = 4.931 p = 0.002 
Panel C : 1998 
Coefficient SD t-ratio p-value 
LnNAV98 
Sponsor 
Audit 
Yrend 
Constant 
0.0196 0.009 2.193 0.033 
-0.0036 0.038 -0.095 0.925 
-0.1400 0.044 -3.178 0.002 
-0.0067 0.034 -0.195 0.846 
0.4880 0.092 5.309 0.000 
R2 = 0.214 R2 (adj.) = 0.154 F-ratio = 3.543 p = 0.012 
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Panel B of Table 6 showed entirely differ- 
ent findings from those found in Panel A 
where the influence of sponsors and auditors 
became insignificant. The variable size re- 
mained statistically insignificant, as was 
found in 1996. However, the variable year- 
became statistically significant as predicted. 
Thus, companies whose year-ends fell after 
May demonstrated a high level of disclosure 
as opposed to companies whose year-ends 
fell before May. Therefore, the influence of 
year-end became more important than other 
variables in the model in explaining the level 
of disclosure for the year 1997. The reason is 
that the SC issued the revised Guidelines 
only in May 1997 and, therefore, the level of 
compliance increased accordingly for com- 
panies whose year-ends were after May 1997. 
The influence of auditor, size and sponsor 
could not be observed because the model 
contained the data of all companies without 
segregating those that had issued the annual 
reports before and those that had issued them 
after the revised Guidelines was in place. 
As for the year 1998, the results shown in 
Panel C of Table 5 suggested that size of funds 
was positively and statistically significant in 
the predieted direction. The influence of size 
of funds was not significant for 1996 and 1997. 
One explanation is that when the SC issued the 
revised Guidelines, the variable fund size be- 
came important because larger trust funds 
might have been under close scrutiny by the 
SC and they were the ones that were expected 
to take the lead in complying with the SC 
Guidelines. Alternatively, the higher level of 
disclosure by larger trust funds might have 
been attributed to their ability to comply with 
the Guidelines given the resources they al- 
ready had and the infrastructure that existed 
in the firm. This could support the earlier 
argument of low information-gathering costs. 
The insignificant influence in both 1996 
and 1997 might have been attributed to their 
unwillingness to disclose information beyond 
what they deemed necessary. With the revised 
Guidelines and DSOP 2, they did not have the 
options but to comply. As for the negative 
influence of auditors on the level of disclosure 
in 1998, one explanation is possible. With the 
Guidelines being mandated to all funds, the 
level of disclosure by funds with smaller audi- 
tors was expected to improve in order to com- 
ply with all the necessary requirements. On 
the other hand, lesser initiatives were expected 
to be taken by the funds with larger auditors in 
order to improve the level of disclosure in 1998 
since the previous disclosure had been reason- 
ably satisfactory (a positive and sigruficant 
influence of auditors on the level of disclosure 
was observed in 1996). 
CONCLUSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Unit trust funds responded positively to the 
effort taken by both the SC and the MASB to 
strengthen the financial reporting practices of 
the industry. This was evidenced by the sic- 
cant increase in the reporting sections of the 
annual reports and accounts among unit trust 
funds as well as the disclosure level, at least, 
immediately after the issuance of the revised 
Guidelines. Nonetheless, the compliance with 
DSOP 2 was still very low. One explanation 
was that DSOP 2 was only introduced during 
the period of the study and it was not consid- 
ered mandatory, as it has not been issued as a 
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Malaysian Accounting Standard. Nonetheless, 
there was a clear upward trend for information 
disclosed in the annual reports over the years 
under study. The total disclosure level also 
showed a signlhcant increase from 0.4279 in 
1996 to 0.8252 in 1998. This trend, at least, 
signals that the industry was moving towards 
the higher disclosure level. 
Findings on the influence of size, auditors 
and sponsors on the disclosure level were 
mixed. Two reasons could be offered. First, the 
period of the study was not constant. In other 
words, the reporting requirements for each 
year of the study were different. Significant 
events took place in 1997 and in 1998, with 
1997 being the most crucial with the issuance 
of the revised Guidelines. Though efforts had 
been taken to control these effects by includ- 
ing a variable known as year-end, the effects 
might stdl persist. Second, the study collapsed 
mandatory requirements (as in the Guide- 
lines) together with the items considered vol- 
untary (as in the DSOP 2). Thus, the differing 
effects might have contributed to the mixed 
findings. Furthermore, because the majority 
of the items were considered as mandatory 
(ninety out of ninety-seven), the mandatory 
items might have confounded the findings. 
Hence, regardless of the specific characteris- 
tics, the disclosure level was predicted to be 
high since the SC had mandated them. 
Further study, however, needs to be car- 
ried out to discover the sections of the Guide- 
lines and standards that are frequently com- 
plied with and to identify reasons why these 
certain sections were complied with. 
Finally, this paper has several limita- 
tions. First, the findings do not extend be- 
yond the unit trust industry. Second, the study 
examined only three aspects of the financial 
reporting for the unit trust industry: the 
Guidelines issued in 1991, the revised Guide- 
lines and the DSOP 2. There are also other 
reporting requirements imposed on unit trust 
funds which were not covered in this paper. 
Examples of these include other accounting 
standards that are also applicable to a unit 
trust fund. With the inclusion of these other 
standards, the amount of voluntary disclo- 
sure would increase and the model could 
predict better the voluntary disclosure prac- 
tices among unit trust funds in Malaysia. 
Perhaps, this could be addressed in future 
research. Third, the period of the study was 
mixed with various significant events: the 
pre-mandatory period (1996), mandatory (but 
considered transitory) period (1997) and the 
issuance of the DSOP 2 (1998). Perhaps, fu- 
ture research could concentrate on looking at 
the pre-mandatory period (prior to 1996) and 
post-mandatory period (post 1998) so that 
the effects could be measured better. 
APPENDIX A 
Contents of Annual Report 
A. Management Review 
1. Description of the scheme. 
2. Investment objectives and policies. 
3. Explanation of the management compa- 
ny’s strategies employed towards achiev- 
ing objectives. 
4. The scheme’s asset allocation as at the date 
of the report. 
5.  Particulars of significant changes in the 
state of affairs of the scheme. 
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6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
Analysis of the performance of the scheme 
(on the basis of unit prices) as at the date of 
the report. 
Breakdown of its components, namely ca- 
pital growth and income distribution. 
Review of the market(s) in which the sch- 
eme invested during the period. 
Where the scheme invests in foreign sec- 
tion, the names of the countries. 
Returns on Investments by market(s). 
Assessment of future prospects of the 
market(s). 
Proposed strategies of the scheme based 
on assessment. 
Particulars of any income distribution. 
Other forms of additional distribution ma- 
de and proposed (e.g, bonus). 
Effect of income and additional distribu- 
tion in terms of Net Asset Value per unit 
before distribution. 
Effect of income and additional distribu- 
tion in terms of Net Asset Value per unit 
after distribution. 
Description and explanation of any 
significant changes in the state of affairs 
of the scheme not otherwise disclosed in 
’ the financial statements. 
18. Breakdown o,f unit holding by size. 
B. Trustee‘s Report 
1. A report stating opinion whether the ma- 
nagement company has managed the 
scheme in accordance with the limitations 
imposed under the Deed, Guidelines, SC 
Regulation 96 and other applicable laws. 
If the manager has not done so, the short- 
comings that may have impact on inves- 
tor’s decision, and 
2. 
3. 
C .  
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Steps taken to address/prevent shortco- 
ming in cases where management has 
not done so. 
Balance Sheet 
Investment not classified as current or 
non-current, but presented in an order 
that reflects each category’s relative liquidity. 
The carrying amount of investment cate- 
gorised into: 
a. Fixed income and other debt securities. 
b. Unquoted equity securities. 
c. Derivatives. 
d. Other collective investment schemes. 
e. All foreign investments. 
f. Any other investments. 
Liquid assets itemised into broad catego- 
ries. 
Significant items in other assets disclosed 
separately. 
Total value of all assets. 
Total value of all liabilities. 
Significant liability items disclosed sepa- 
rately. 
Net asset value of the scheme. 
9. Number of units in circulation. 
10. Net asset value per unit (clearly stated as 
ex-divided where applicable). 
11. Unit holders’ break down into capital, un- 
distributed income, investment fluctuati- 
on reserve. 
D. Statement of Income and Expenditure 
( I m  
1. Interest income, dividend income, realis- 
ed gains/losses on sale of investment 
shown separately. 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
5.  
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
E. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
F. 
1. 
2. 
G .  
1. 
Management’s fees and charges with each 
type of fee and charge shown separately. 
Basis of fees and charges. 
Trustee’s fees, and any reimbursement of 
trustee’s expenses. 
Basis of charging of trustee fees. 
Auditor’s fees. 
Net income before taxation. 
Net income after taxation. 
Undistributed income brought forward. 
Undistributed income carried forward. 
Total amount of distribution (net). 
Distribution per unit (gross). 
Distribution per unit (net). 
Interim and final distribution shown se- 
parately. 
Date of each distribution. 
Dividend Equalisation in distributable 
income, net of tax. 
Statement of Changes in Net Asset Value 
Net asset value (beginning). 
Net asset value (ending). 
Net income for the period. 
Changes in unrealised investment gains 
or losses. 
Amounts received from units created. 
Amounts paid for units cancelled. 
Distribution to the unit holders. 
-. 
Cash Flow Statement 
Operating and investment activities. 
Financing activities. 
Notes to the Financial Statements 
Income recognition basis for the following 
investments. 
2. Income recogrution basis for the following 
dividends. 
3. Income recognition basis for the following 
interests. 
Maximum units allowed for issue under 
the provision of the trust deed. 
5. Units created/cancelled during the period 
(number of units created as additional dis- 
tribution, if any). 
6. Broker transactions with the top 10 
brokers by value trade. 
7. Aggregate amount of brokerage/commis- 
sion fees. 
8. Fees paid to each broker expressed in 
value. 
Fees paid to each broker expressed in 
percentage. 
4. 
9. 
10. Highlights of related brokers. 
11. Number of units held by management 
12. Number of units held by related company. 
13. Composition of investment portfolio of 
the scheme as at the date of the report 
grouped in the appropriate categories, 
showing quantity held. 
14. Composition of investment portfolio of 
the scheme as at the date of the report 
grouped in the appropriate categories, 
showing cost of investment. 
15. Composition of investment portfolio of 
the scheme as at the date of the report 
grouped in the appropriate categories, 
showing MV of investment. 
16. Composition of investment portfolio of 
the scheme as at the date of the report 
grouped in the appropriate categories, 
showing MV of each holding as a % of 
NAV. 
company. 
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17. Composition of investment portfolio of 13. Portfolio turnover of the scheme. 
18 
19. 
20. 
21. 
H. 
I. 
the scheme as at the date of the report 
grouped in the appropriate categories, 
showing individual investments. 
Related party transaction (RPT) identity of 
financial institution/ stockbroker or other 
company that controls the management 
company. 
Related party transaction (RPT) nature of 
related party relationship. 
Related party transaction (RPT) type of 
transactions. 
Related party transaction (RPT) elements 
of transactions. 
Auditor’s Report 
Performance Data 
14. Average annual return measured over the 
period 1 year. 
15. Average annual return measured over the 
period 3 years. 
16. Average annual return measured over the 
period 5. 
17. Average annual return measured over the 
periods since the launch to the date of 
report. 
18. Voluntary disclosure performance of the 
relevant benchmark indices. 
19. Voluntary disclosure clearly stated that 
past performance is not necessarily in- 
dicative of future performance. 
20. Voluntary disclosure unit prices and in- 
vestment returns may fluctuate. 
A comparative table covering the last 5 finan- 
cial years or over the whole of the period in 
which it has been in existence, showing: 
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